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Abstract
In this paper, I demonstrate that the existing legal frameworks for database pro-
tection are inadequate – the American framework under-protects databases, while the Eu-
ropean framework over-protects. This paper presents an economic analysis of the current 
scope of legal protections for databases versus the ideal, with an especial emphasis on 
the role of intellectual property rights in providing these protections, and concludes with 
proposals for an ideal system. After an overview of the current systems of legal protections 
for databases in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), there will be an ex-
planation of how different types of laws (competition, contract, and most importantly, in-
tellectual property rights) impact the production and innovation of databases. The analysis 
will show that intellectual property rights are the most comprehensive and efficient form of 
legal protection due to its ability to limit transaction costs, provide adequate incentives for 
production, and maintain a reasonable barrier to entry. The scope and specificity of legal 
protections affects both the static and dynamic efficiency of markets, impacting not just 
the health of market functions, but also the growth and development of innovation. The 
proper scope of protection and whether intellectual property rights are the optimal source 
of protection depends on the economic nature of databases. If databases were to be treated 
as a commodity by the law, it is necessary for the law to accurately reflect the type of good 
that it is regulating, as different types of goods require different incentive structures. The 
paper will conclude with recommendations for an ideal legal system for the protection 
and regulation of databases, starting with accurately defining databases and ending with 
reasonable terms for copyrights. The solution is to find the balance between the US and the 
EU systems in terms of issue definition, economic incentives, and legal theory. 
Introduction
With the rise of “data driven decision making” and the exponential growth of 
information goods (of which databases are a subset), databases are becoming increasingly 
valuable resources that will enable innovations across markets and borders. Because data-
bases are becoming key components of increasingly complex decision-making processes, 
the policies and regulations of data also will rise in importance due to their ability to en-
able or limit the usage of data on individual or institutional levels. The legal protection of 
databases comes from various sources, including contracts, licensure, and antitrust, but the 
area of most significant interest is intellectual property (IP), specifically that of copyright.
This paper will be examining the efficiency of the current US and EU legal mod-
els for IP rights, and the extent to which databases can or should be protected. The robust-
ness of copyright systems will be evaluated by weighing how well the system maximizes 
the utility individuals derive from owning IP rights against how well the system maximizes 
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the utility society derives from allowing others to own IP rights. The study of this topic will 
be broken down into three parts. The first part will consider how databases are currently 
protected, the legal purposes for protecting databases, and how those protections shape 
the distribution of rights and powers. The second part will discuss the economic purposes 
of protecting databases, and how those protections shape the distribution of wealth. The 
third part will explore an alternative to the existing legal systems, and explain why a more 
middle of the ground approach is preferable. This will be done by comparing legal and 
economics foundations of the US and EU legal systems, and discussing the effects of each.
The analysis in this paper must necessarily combine legal and economic theory, 
as it is the interaction between the two that should guide the regulation of databases. Data-
bases are a “good” (in the economic sense) whose properties have changed dynamically in 
recent times. Therefore, the legal remedies for their protection should reflect these chang-
es. This study of databases begins with clarifying how current legal systems address the 
legal protection of databases, discussing the purposes of such laws, and how they differ 
between the two of the most prominent legal systems: that of the United States, and of the 
European Union. Following the contrasts between the legal two systems will be a discus-
sion of the economic dynamics that these systems create. The paper will seek to show that 
these two systems are at extreme ends of the spectrum (under- and over-protection), and 
that a modified system in the middle ground would be more economically efficient. 
Legal Protection of Databases Today: Two Extremes
The general definition of databases for both the US and the EU usually fall under 
the category of compilations, with compilations defined as a literary production composed 
of the works of others, arranged according to a certain method. In other words, collectives 
or collections of materials, including but not limited to facts, data, or works of art/ liter-
ature. The nuance within this definition is that there is an important distinction between 
the copyright of the actual data, and also the copyright of how the database is assembled, 
or ‘compiled’. Additionally, there is a distinction between the US and EU standards with 
regards to what kinds of works merit copyright protection. Where the US primarily rec-
ognizes the creativity (but not all intellectual activity) that goes into the creation of the 
database as the threshold, the EU recognizes both the creativity and investment that goes 
into creating either the data or the databases, hence the additional ‘sweat of the brow’ 
investment doctrine that the EU implements in its assessment of database copyrights. Un-
der the EU’s investment doctrine, copyrights can be awarded on the basis of substantial 
investment alone. 
In order to compare the condition of having database protection versus the condi-
tion of not having database protection, it is important to highlight the differences between 
how copyright has evolved under the United States model as opposed to the European 
Union model. This is because the United States has no formal, specific copyright pro-
tections for databases beyond conforming to the Berne Convention of 1886, which only 
grants ‘thin’ copyright protection to databases due to the difficulty of classifying databas-
es within the current US intellectual property regime. The landmark case for the United 
States is the Feist vs. Rural Supreme Court case, where the court found no infringement of 
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copyright on the basis that the underlying information that made up the database were not, 
in themselves, protected by copyright.1 Following the requirement of minimal creativity 
by authors, the method of compilation utilized by the plaintiff (Rural) was not sufficiently 
original to warrant copyright protection, which resulted in the court ruling non-infringe-
ment for the defendant. Minimal creativity simply means any sort of intellectual effort to 
somehow transform or, in this case, re-arrange the materials. The plaintiff did not use an 
unusual or specific arrangement in their compilation of uncopyrightable facts (people’s 
names, addresses, and phone numbers), and so did not receive copyright protection for 
their phonebook. The European Union avoids this type of distinction by having a sui ge-
neris (of its own category) right for database protection after passing the Database Direc-
tive in 1996.
As explained in previous sections, intellectual property law is at the frontier of 
ensuring the health of the database industry, and also an effective way of ensuring a bal-
ance between innovation and access. Within the domain of intellectual property, copy-
right is the main source of legal protection for databases. Logistically, while databases are 
products that exhibit traits of both expressive and technical works, they are not rigorously 
technical enough to claim patent protection, and thus have a better claim to copyright pro-
tection. However, the manners in which databases are compiled, curated, or organized are 
expressive of original thought and creativity, while the creation of databases is indicative 
of a technically innovative nature, especially in modern methods of creating and maintain-
ing databases. Additionally, the curation, compilation, and organization of databases are 
increasingly done through codes in a variety of programming languages, which further 
complicates the question of how wide the scope of legal protection for databases should 
extend. 
The discrepancies in copyright law across national boundaries are also a chal-
lenge, as there are many different systems but no internationally unifying system. While 
there is not currently a common ‘international copyright’, there are some loose agreements 
between nations to govern copyrights across borders. As such, though copyright standards 
still deviate across countries and regions, there does exist some minimum standards that 
most countries have agreed to adhere by, such as not granting copyright indefinitely, or 
reciprocating protection across borders. Among the most prominent of these agreements 
are the Universal Copyright Convention, the Berne Convention, and membership in the 
United Nations-affiliated but functionally independent global forum, the World Intellectu-
al Property Organization (WIPO). 
In terms of such international agreements, the Universal Copyright Convention 
was adopted in 1952, while the Berne Convention was adopted before it, in 1886. The 
Berne convention requires the application of each country’s copyright protections to works 
published within said country.2 This was the cause for disputes, ranging from particulars 
about the duration of protection to more serious, philosophical disagreements about having 
limited, non-renewable terms at all (as opposed to allowing perpetual renewal). These phil-
osophical disagreements would go on to shape the ways that copyright develops in the US, 
the EU, and Commonwealth systems. The Universal Copyright Convention was designed 
1  Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
2  Berne Convention Implementation Act of  1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 1988.
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to overcome some of these disagreements, while one of the most prominent dissenting 
members was the United States.3 Among these conflicts, the United States and other sys-
tems to it granted protection for fixed, renewable terms (as opposed to the non-renewable 
term under the Berne Convention), and required registration with the Copyright Office 
(forbidden under the Berne Convention). Though these two different types of internation-
al agreements have since started converging towards a middle ground, there are still too 
many gaps between these systems of copyright laws for implementation on a truly glob-
al scale. The WIPO plays a role in the process of reconciling these differences. Though 
it does not create international legislation, it serves as an international platform through 
which minimum standards for international intellectual property can be debated, and dif-
ferent systems of intellectual property legislation researched.
For the purposes of this paper, the copyright laws of the US will be contrasted to 
those of the EU, since they represent not only the two most dominant systems of copyright 
laws, but also two systems derived from different philosophical and theoretical founda-
tions. 
Although other legal protections for databases like contracts or competition (an-
ti-trust in U.S. law) do exist, copyright is still the most dominant form of protection be-
cause it confers property rights to the owners of databases. This is because a property right 
like copyright gives the owner the powers to exclude a priori, instead of the power to seek 
damages a posteriori. As copyright law currently stands, the United States and the Europe-
an Union have two different models of copyright by which databases are influenced. The 
most salient point of differentiation between these two models is the underlying philosoph-
ical justifications upon which the two models are built. The United States model has pri-
marily Utilitarian foundations (greatest good for the greatest number), while the European 
Union model4 combines the Utilitarian and Personal Rights justifications (personal rights 
exceed overall societal gain in importance). These differences in the scope of protection 
for intellectual properties (and subsequently, databases), directly impact the economic effi-
ciency of these models. Under-protection can lead to market failure by discouraging new-
comer entry into the market, while over-protection can lead to market failure by creating 
artificially high barriers that block newcomers completely. 
In the United States, copyright protection is only provided for compilations (like 
databases) if there is significant creativity in the selection or arrangement, since copyright 
in the United States is meant to protect the expression of ideas, rather than ideas or infor-
mation themselves. The model makes sense if it only regulates the universe of literary and 
expressive works since they do behave like public goods once released in the market.  To 
extend the exact same regulations to information commodities does not make sense. Cur-
rent copyright protections for databases are very thin and unreliable, since databases usu-
ally fail the ‘modicum of originality’ requirement or the original authorship requirement. 
Databases are usually protected through alternative measures such as licensure, contracts, 
DRM programs, etc. 
3  Universal Copyright Convention, 1952.
4  The European Union is also sometimes refereed to as the European Economic 
Community in discussions of  copyright. However, for the sake of  simplicity this paper will 
use the terms “US model” and “EU model” to denote the different legal systems.
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Under this model, databases are treated as compilations, which means that there is 
no protection for the actual data or information that make up the database, unless the data 
or information itself is also copyrightable. The landmark case for this distinction is Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co, where the court ruled that the manner in 
which Rural’s phonebook was compiled did not satisfy the ‘modicum of creativity’ thresh-
old to qualify as a work meriting intellectual property protection.5 This ruling essentially 
limits the scope of intellectual property protection for databases, and prevents only the 
taking of selection or arrangement of data. After the Feist v. Rural decision, compilations 
(of which databases are an example) do not qualify for copyright protection. The most 
significant impact of this ruling is that compilations are copyrightable only with respect 
to the selection, coordination, or arrangement of material. Therefore, in order for a work 
to qualify, it would need to demonstrate sufficient creativity in their “selection, coordina-
tion or arrangement” to render them “original works of authorship” entitled to copyright 
protection. This stems from the interesting characteristic of US law where facts are not 
copyrightable. As databases are usually compilations of facts, it is very rare for databases 
to qualify for copyright.
The problems with the US copyright regime lies with the discrepancy between the 
actual nature of databases as a good (how it behaves as a good in markets), and the type of 
good that this regime is meant to address. In fact, the current US copyright regime is poised 
to disincentivize the production of databases by treating databases as normal public goods 
(non-excludable, non-rivalrous goods with positive income elasticity of demand, i.e. na-
tional security or education). The discrepancy largely stems from the way copyright is 
centered on creativity and method of expression, providing very thin protections to works 
like databases. This thin copyright of the US is sufficient in protecting intellectual products 
such as literary or creative works, but insufficient in protecting those of more technical na-
tures like databases. The language of copyright laws emphasize the creativity in “arrange-
ment, coordination, or selection of data in databases”, but the threshold of creativity does 
not adequately capture the increasingly finer distinguishing characteristics of databases 
that merit protection and databases that do not merit protection. The complete abandon-
ment of the “sweat of the brow doctrine” is problematic for an intellectual good that is in 
truth a mix between public and private goods of the common pool resource variety. This 
type of good is is non-excludable but rival in nature, which naturally requires a different 
set of legislation than a pure public good, which the current system is designed for. 
Under the European Union Database Directive, copyright protection is granted if 
there is some creativity in selection or arrangement much like in the United States, but with 
a sui generis (separate) right for database materials. The copyright component prevents 
others from taking the selection or the arrangement of data. The sui generis component 
protects the investments that went into obtaining, verifying, and eventually, presenting the 
actual data in the form of a database. In short, the sui generis right offers protection on the 
basis of “sweat of the brow”, rewarding investments of labor and capital separately from 
the investments of creation. The scope of this regime’s protections is much wider than that 
of the US, which only rewards the investments of creativity. Basically, the Database Direc-
5  Merges, Robert P., Peter Seth Menell, and Mark A. Lemley. Intellectual Property in the 
New Technological Age. 6th ed. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2012. 440-449. 
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tive and the sui generis right combined prohibits unauthorized extraction or re-utilization 
of substantial parts of data, giving owners of data, not just the database, exclusive property 
rights. It is important to note that while the sui generis right is not explicitly an intellectual 
property right according to Articles 7.1 and 7.3 of the Directive, it effectively acts as one.6 
As Derclaye’s assessment of the sui generis right’s nature states, the sui generis right can 
be conceptualized as the codification of unfair competition law (specifically the prevention 
of parasitism) into an intellectual property right.7
At first glance, the EU’s sui generis right might seem to solve the problem of the 
U.S.’s under-protection. However, the introduction of the new sui generis database right 
makes is unclear whether it maintains the balance between the rights of creators with the 
rights of users. Like the U.S. legal system, the EU system also lacks definition with respect 
to the identification of databases and the typology of databases, and actually has a greater 
gap in protection of fact-centric works, since it does not clearly distinguish between types 
or sources of data, as the US does. Furthermore, while the Directive protects substantial 
investment in the creation of databases, it does not specify what constitutes ‘substantial’ 
and does not provide a de minimis standard. Lastly, while there are some fair use excep-
tions to the sui generis, these are not many in number and can therefore create too many 
loopholes for creators to unnecessarily monopolize information to the point where society 
loses utility. Therefore, it can be observed that the EU system is also problematic, in the 
sense that it widens the scope of protection by too wide a margin.
Where the US under-protects the copyright of databases, the EU over-protects 
them. By issuing both copyright and the sui generis protection as found in the Database 
Directive, databases essentially enjoy a two-fold protection. Since the passing of the Data-
base Directive, databases enjoy separates protection under copyright laws and sui generis 
rights. This is a problem not only because of the two-fold protection, but also because 
it creates a great discrepancy in international copyright relations. To put the differences 
between the US model and the EU model succinctly, the differences are those between 
means and ends. The system of the US is Utilitarian in its most basic justification, because 
the ultimate end goal of its copyright laws is not to protect the right of the author, but 
rather to maximize the overall social utility. This is evident in the Court’s rhetoric, which 
emphasizes the granting of intellectual property rights as a way to incentivize the creation 
of such works as protected by copyright, rather than a way to preserve any fundamental 
rights that an author might deserve. Thus in the US treatment of copyrightable works, the 
originality of the work is of utmost importance: underlying data does not usually qualify 
for protection in terms of originality, only those parts of the database as created through 
intellectual activity (manner of arrangement, selection of data, etc.) are copyrightable. The 
purpose of this is to reward only the investments of intellectual activity, not those invest-
ments typical of what is called ‘sweat of the brow’ in legal scholarship – the investments 
of time, labor, or finances. 
6  European Union (EU): Directive No. 96/9/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the 
Council, of  11 March 1996 on the legal protection of  databases, Art. 7.1-7.3, March, 1996. http://
www.wipo.int
7  Derclaye, Estelle. The Legal Protection of  Databases a Comparative Analysis. Chelten-
ham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008. 253-257.
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The granting of intellectual property rights in the US is therefore a mean to the 
end of societal utility maximization, whereas the system of the EU is a means by which 
to protect the ends of personal rights. The laws of the EU are based more on the Personal 
Rights of copyright owners, or the philosophy of the ‘droit d’auteur’ (literally: right of 
author). This philosophical justification manifests itself most clearly in the EU’s creation 
of the Database Director, or more specifically, Article 4. This Article states that “the author 
of a database shall be the natural person or group of natural persons who created the base 
or, where the legislation of the Member States so permits, the legal person designated as 
the right holder by that legislation” 8
The stress on authorship highlights the philosophical priority, especially since (as 
per Article 5) the author has the exclusive right to carry out or to authorize reproductions, 
translations, derivative works, distributions, communications to the public, and reproduc-
tions of the database, with rather loosely defined ‘fair use’ exceptions.
Furthermore, by treating data itself as an intellectual product, the EU legislation 
is emphasizing the role of authorship in determining whether something deserves to be 
protected by the granting of intellectual property rights. And rather than just creativity, the 
standard for meriting protection also includes considerations of investment. 
 Now that the differences between the two extremes are clear, it is necessary 
to first clarify how these different legal systems affect the economics and incentive struc-
tures of database production, regulation, and innovation before discussing how the ideal 
system should be structured
Economics of Intellectual Property, Competition and Contract Law
This section will give a succinct account of the roles of each of the three neigh-
boring areas of the law, explain the extent to which each provides legal protection, and 
conclude that intellectual property rights is currently the area that best fits the system 
requirements for protecting databases. In the next section, I will explain why databases are 
not purely private or public goods, and how that changes the way we should think about 
the intellectual property rights framework.
Databases need regulation for the same reasons that other products of intellectual 
activity need them: to protect the financial interests of the owners of such products such 
that they will continue to create them, but also limiting ownership rights such that there 
remains a reasonably low barrier to entry. Legal protection is primarily acheived through 
three separate areas of the law: intellectual property, competition, and contracts. Contract 
law, while important, does not impact the market structure or incentives on the same level 
as intellectual property and competition, and so will not be discussed in this paper since the 
topic is concerned with how legislation shapes market behavior, rather than the behavior 
of individual entities.  
In order to determine the optimal scope of legal protection for databases, it is 
necessary to first understand the two main areas of legislation that govern databases: in-
tellectual property and competition law. These two areas of law shape the economics of 
8  European Union (EU): Directive No. 96/9/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the 
Council
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databases by defining them as goods, limiting monopolies thereof, as well as creating 
incentive structures for innovation and competition. In this section, the purposes of intel-
lectual property and competition laws in the regulation of markets will be explained first. 
Then, there will be a discussion on the relationship between these two areas of the law, 
and how they work together. This is to build an understanding of where the boundaries of 
intellectual property end, and where those of competition law begin, so that a regime ca-
pable of regulating databases with more economic efficiency than the currently dominant 
ones can be identified. 
Both intellectual property and competition law are designed to maximize the ef-
ficiency of markets. However, it can be argued that intellectual property aims to maximize 
the efficiency of production in the long term (dynamic efficiency), as opposed to maximiz-
ing the efficiency of short-term production (static efficiency). Since dynamic efficiency 
aims to maximize the efficiency of production in the long run, this is the efficiency most 
relevant to the production of databases, as the database industry requires the development 
of newer, better technologies in order to continue its upward trajectory.
The purpose of intellectual property is extremely similar to that of traditional, 
tangible property: affording protection to products in order to prevent and remedy market 
failures. Intellectual property rights allow the markets for products of intellectual activity 
(such as databases) to function properly by increasing efficiency in several ways. 
First of all, intellectual property rights allow for the existence of markets by way 
of creating a system through which allocations of resources can take place efficiently 
through peaceful transactions (as opposed to through violent means as in a Hobbesian state 
of nature). The existence of ownership enables trade by facilitating trades, where the own-
ership of those products of intellectual activity can be bought, sold, transferred, or rented. 
Secondly, intellectual property rights increase dynamic efficiency by creating an 
incentive structure that rewards investment in intellectual properties, thus also enabling 
the dissemination of information. This is probably the most common justification for the 
existence of intellectual property rights. Basically, the creators of intellectual products 
must have some way of recouping their investments as incentive to undertake the invest-
ment in the first place. Intellectual property rights can supply this incentive very efficiently 
(especially for products with both private and public good characteristics), as it gives the 
owners ways to trade and make profits off of the intellectual products by way of engaging 
in trade. On the other hand, there is the conflicting question of creating social good through 
the dissemination of information and knowledge. This conflict between private and public 
interests is one of the biggest challenges in the study of intellectual property rights: finding 
the balance between giving a wide enough scope of protection to incentivize investment 
and creation, but not giving so much protection that the creative process is inhibited by 
the intellectual property rights. The question is even more complex (and will be discussed 
more in-depth later) for intellectual products like databases, which are relegated to the gray 
area between literary and technical works. 9 
Lastly, property rights allow for the exclusion of usage, which also plays a role in 
9  Landes, William M., and Richard A. Posner. “Antitrust and Intellectual Property.” 
In The Economic Structure of  Intellectual Property Law, 372-380. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2003. 
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the efficient allocation of resources. This is useful in both the cases of private and public 
goods. For example, private goods are rivalrous, and property rights would allow for the 
most economically efficient scenario of having a single individual or a select few individ-
uals decide on the rules for exclusion. On the other hand, public goods are non-rivalrous 
(i.e. usage by multiple individuals does not diminish its value), and the most economically 
efficient scenario in this case would be to disseminate the use of the good as widely as 
possible. By enforcing intellectual property rights, exclusion from consumption will be 
possible, but the goods can remain non-rivalrous. This way, the producers can make prof-
its, but the public can also maximize benefits from dissemination.
On the other hand, while competition law (also known as anti-trust law in the 
US) is also meant to regulate the market, it does so by promoting competition so that the 
consumer can benefit from an absence of unfair monopolies, rather than granting bounded 
monopolistic rights to owners as intellectual property law does. The objectives of competi-
tion law are achieved by imposing a posteriori restrictions on undesirable behavior, unlike 
the a priori restrictions that intellectual property imposes.10 For example, competition law 
punishes those who gain monopolies or other types of market dominance unfairly (i.e. 
bribing, collusion), or those who abuse their dominant positions to extract unfair benefits 
from other firms or from consumers, thus unfairly restraining trade and deviating from 
optimal utility (i.e. monopolistic price-setting). In other words, the purpose of competition 
law includes preventing abuses of the legal powers that come from intellectual property 
rights, particularly the potential for abusing the monopoly power that intellectual property 
rights grant, temporarily or otherwise.
Additionally, competition law generates more economic welfare by creating in-
centives to innovate. Because price systems are restricted to prevent excessive monopolis-
tic or oligopolistic behavior, producers of databases must find other ways outside of high 
prices to generate value. Innovation would be the answer to such a necessity, as it is the 
most cost effective way for producers to add value. In turn, innovation will drive healthy 
competition, leading to more societal benefits for consumers.
The common underlying assumption of both intellectual property and competi-
tion laws is that the free market competition will yield the most economically efficient bal-
ance of innovation and wealth generation for the greatest number. However, free markets 
are still shaped by the decision-makers, and neither firms nor individuals can or should be 
assumed to act rationally at all times. Though the ways in which they regulate markets may 
seem to be in conflict, it is more accurate to characterize them as complementary bodies of 
law – there is a division of labor between these two areas in the overall goal of maintaining 
beneficial free market competition. Intellectual property rights create the grounds for inno-
vation and evolution by protecting those who introduce innovative products and services. 
Competition law seeks to keep those activities and powers that intellectual property grants 
under control, such that the success of the few are not achieved by unjustifiable expenses 
of the others. Both seek to improve dynamic efficiency and long run economic growth. 
Both ultimately serve to further the interests and welfare of the consumers. 
 Despite shared goals, intellectual property rights should be prioritized sim-
ply because it is the first layer in the foundation for dynamic economic efficiency in the 
database markets. Without a properly delineated set of intellectual property rights, the 
10  Ibid.
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very basics of trade will be difficult, and there will be little competition to observe, much 
less regulate.  Due to this hierarchy of priority, the second part the study will focus on the 
economics of intellectual property rights (especially copyright), and how they apply to 
databases, products that exist in the gray area between literary and technical works. 
Databases: Public or Private Goods?
The second part of determining the optimal scope of legal protection is to take an 
even closer look at the economics at play under the different legal systems. In particular, 
the definition of databases affects the way the system is structured, and ultimately how 
databases are treated. By producing different incentive structures, systems can either reg-
ulate a market efficiently, fail to put boundaries on economic activities, or stifle a market 
with too many rules. To begin, it is necessary to define databases in an economic context. 
Defining the type of goods that databases are will inform whether or not the legal system 
is balancing incentives to create with incentives for innovation. The definition of databases 
as goods and the balance between incentives are the two challenges that this section seeks 
to discuss, and explain how controlled monopolies and competition can actually foster 
innovation. 
The difficulty of trying to fit databases into the current copyright models lies with 
the changing nature of both copyright and databases, especially since databases can take 
a variety of forms. The most prevalent analysis of databases is to treat databases as public 
goods (non-excludable, non-rivalrous goods) and to discuss copyright law as a means to 
reduce transaction costs and to further the dissemination of knowledge by giving those 
who produce intellectual public goods a way to recoup investments. Copyright started out 
as a simple mechanism by which the law can ensure each man can claim the profits of any 
intellectual product he may create, when it was first conceived as an alternative to the old 
patent laws inspired by the Gutenberg press.11 Authors were compensated for the printing 
of their works with copyrights, and printers were compensated for their printing technol-
ogy with patents. In short, copyright is meant to give protection to the rights of those who 
produce intellectual goods that become public goods if released to the public – goods that 
become non-excludable and do not diminish in value even when consumed by many.
Databases, on the other hand, are now increasingly produced by the private sec-
tor, rather than by the government, which was traditionally the case until recently. Data-
bases have also become more complex in their structure and designs, corresponding to the 
demands created by the proliferation of big data and exponential application of the Internet 
of Things (IOT). This is due to the rising prevalence of computers and super-computers, 
which can store and manipulate large amounts of big data, greatly speeding up the capture, 
analysis, curation, transfer, and visualization that goes into the processing of databases. 
The prevalence of databases in decision-making is such that they are now often a neces-
sity, especially for those industries that deal with predictive analyses. The applications of 
databases are now more varied and different from traditional economic considerations. 
Depending on the needs of the owner, a database can consist simply of some information 
11  Merges, Robert P., Peter Seth Menell, and Mark A. Lemley. “Brief History of 
Copyright Protection.” 430-434.
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stored on excel spreadsheets, or a quantity of information so big that they need to be stored 
in relational database management systems (RDBMS) or cloud servers, and need to be 
manipulated with programs or languages such as SQL. Additionally, while databases can 
be produced solely for the purposes of trading and profit, many companies now also create 
databases in-house. This makes the markets of databases difficult to define, as one data-
base can arguably be products within multiple markets, depending on how it is utilized. 
Most importantly, new applications mean new business models, which in turn require a 
reconsideration of copyright law’s adequacy in providing a balanced amount of protection.
Another difficulty arises in distinguishing between code and database, especial-
ly due to the distinctions drawn between databases and computer software, whereas the 
proliferation of big data has often blurred the line of where ‘public information’ ends and 
‘authored creation’ begin. There has not been a definite distinction between the two for 
databases, and data that has been manipulated by code or by calculations lie in the gray 
areas of legal definition. However, as the current US system specifies that code enjoys its 
own copyright and the EU system does not specify whether code is protected with or as a 
part of databases, this paper will not discuss this issue extensively. It is sufficient to note 
the existence of this controversy, because it indicates an incomplete understanding of what 
type or types of goods databases should be classified as. 
All of these different elements mean that databases are neither perfect public 
goods nor perfect private goods. A public good is one that is both non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous, or one from which individuals cannot be excluded from use, and where the 
use of the good by multiple users does not diminish its value. A private good is one that’s 
excludable and scarce, or one from which individuals can be excluded from use (unless 
they buy the good or obtain usage otherwise), and where the use of the good by multiple 
users diminishes its value. Although databases are typically treated as public goods, there 
is reason to believe that if databases are to be treated as commodities, they would be some-
where in between the spectrum of public and private goods, as they exhibit characteristics 
of both in the marketplace, depending on the nature of the database. 
While they are non-excludable if released to the public, the value of databases 
can, in fact, diminish in value if there are multiple users, especially unauthorized users. 
This is because the principal value of some commercial databases resides in its exclusivity, 
either in terms of point of access, access in general, or singularity of source. Take for ex-
ample databases that consist of real-time or time-sensitive data. A major part of the value 
proposition of such databases is the advantage of obtaining data before others, or gaining 
access to the up-to-date information possible. If a release to a third party occurs (against 
whom the database owner cannot seek legal remedy due to how contract law works), then 
the database not only becomes non-excludable, but also diminishes in value because it 
loses the exclusivity of early access, which can be interpreted as a loss in scarcity. 
Alternatively, while the obtaining of ‘free copies’ of databases without time-sen-
sitive data does not theoretically affect its integrity or objective, such a situation does affect 
its market value, again due to the decrease in exclusivity or scarcity of this product.12 In 
these aspects, a database more closely resembles a private good. Thus the actual position 
12  Boldrin, Michelle, and David Levine. “Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allo-
cation of  Social Surplus from Innovations.” In Property Rights Dynamics: A Law and Economics 
Perspective. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007. 101.
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of databases on the spectrum spanning from public to private good would be determined 
by the nature of the database in question, and the data that it is comprised of. Singularity 
of source refers to databases that include information that only exists in that database or in 
a very limited number of databases, because the information is laborious and difficult to 
generate or to discover. However, these processes do not necessarily or typically involve 
creativity and would fail to obtain copyright protection. Although it is technically true that 
the information existed before being generated or discovered by the database author(s), 
it would not have been generated or discovered otherwise. It would be unwise to exclude 
these types of information products from protection due to a simple threshold test, since 
it would reduce the amount of such information products in the market (due to inability 
of producers to recoup costs). Again, these scenarios illustrate how it is almost arbitrary 
to limit copyrights to works of creativity or originality in the absence of a way to protect 
products that require otherwise intellectually and financially demanding investments.
The numerous ways in which to categorize databases indicate that a simple thresh-
old like that of the U.S. system or the somewhat arbitrary commitment to personal rights 
over societal gains of the EU system is also not precise enough to effectively determine an 
appropriate scope of protection for each database.13 Accordingly, the economic purpose of 
protecting databases is not just to preserve value for those who produce databases, but also 
for those who are on the consumers of databases. Legal protection can increase welfare not 
only by preventing dead weight loss in the form of inefficient trade, but also by conserving 
product value.
Defense of The Middle Ground
In this section, I argue that the economic arguments in the earlier sections neces-
sitate a revision of the law on databases. More specifically, I make the case for a middle 
ground between the current extremes exemplified by the US and EU systems. 
Changes in the creation, dissemination, and application of databases fueled by 
technology’s increasingly rapid growth have outstripped the progress of the laws that gov-
ern their activities. Although agility is not a word normally associated with the law, it 
might become a necessary characteristic when applied to industries of dynamic change. 
The role of the database industry is so central to developments across sectors that it is of 
utmost importance that it is regulated in an economically efficient manner. It can be argued 
that the key to success in creating an economically efficient system of regulation for data-
bases lies in the balancing of multiple moving parts, as the problem itself is multi-faceted. 
The biggest challenge with aligning these moving parts is to find a balance between main-
taining the incentive to create and the incentive to innovate. 
From the legal perspective of the debate, it is a question of balancing the indi-
vidual’s economic interests with those of society. This is why ownership of intellectual 
products is an integral part of the ideal legal system, such that the creativity and labor that 
goes into producing them can be rewarded. In the absence of ownership, there can be no 
incentive to create, as individuals have nothing to gain from creating databases that will 
13  Derclaye, Estelle. The Legal Protection of  Databases a Comparative Analysis. Chelten-
ham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008. 32-33
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ultimately lead to exploitation from society, especially if the databases created is somehow 
unfairly disseminated without consent. From the economic perspective of the debate, it is 
a question of stabilizing the markets by setting boundaries for different players. Without 
clear boundaries, it would be too easy to abuse rights without serious repercussions, which 
would create unfair advantages and thus discourage the creation and innovation that lead 
to dissemination of knowledge to the public. Therefore, the wants and needs of the public 
must keep those of the individual in check, and vice versa.
Putting these two analytical perspectives together, the ideal system would lie 
somewhere between the threshold system of the United States and the two-pronged system 
of copyright and sui generis right of the European Union. Where the United States system 
under-protects databases by a lack of specification, the European Union over-protects by 
establishing a system that could potentially provide two-fold protection. To find a point of 
balance between these two systems, some degree of agility is necessary in order to satisfy 
considerations from both the legal and the economic side. 
To begin with, there should be a defined set of typologies of databases, such that 
the appropriate remedies can be applied to the appropriate types of products. Starting with 
the definition, one needs to recognize the fact that the category of ‘database’ encompass-
es a very broad spectrum of products, with varying levels of complexity, creativity, and 
volume. It would appear that a single threshold, such as the US system relies on, would 
be insufficient to effectively regulate the market activities of databases – separating the 
universe of databases into two parts would be a gross over-generalization. Instead, there 
should be a multi-tiered approach to determine the scope of rights granted, so that different 
levels of investments in intellectual creativity and labor can be rewarded accordingly. For 
example, a database that is high in creativity and labor should not be awarded the same 
rights as a database that is high in creativity but low in effort, because overall, the latter did 
not require the same investments (intellectual or otherwise) to create as the former. 
Next, the tiers of such rights should be measured according to a weighted ‘formu-
la’ of sorts: creativity should have higher rewards than effort, but effort should not be com-
pletely neglected either. This is because while the primary purpose of intellectual property 
is to encourage creativity and innovation, it is important to remember that oftentimes, 
products of creativity are derived from the fruits of plain, un-creative labor. To cut out the 
value of labor would be to do a great disservice to the goal of innovation for the sake of 
social welfare. One way to conceptualize this would be to think of the granting of intel-
lectual property rights as a sort of quid pro quo between the innovator and society. Society 
rewards the innovator for all of his efforts by giving him a temporary monopoly over his 
creation, and in return, the innovator gives to society his creation after he has recouped a 
reasonable amount to make the undertaking worth his while in the first place. In the case of 
copyright-protected works like databases, the nature of innovation usually occurs in small 
steps, as opposed to the larger strides observable in patentable technologies, for example. 
This means that along the way, the unrecognized value of labor becomes a deterrent to new 
creativity, as potential innovators see no reason to risk not regaining their investments if 
their product is not guaranteed protection.
The duration of copyright is also of great importance. If copyrights can be re-
newed indefinitely, then it would be, in effect, a perpetual and everlasting copyright that 
would harmfully deprive society of the utility of information flow. Although Landes and 
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Posner argue that the size of public domain of works has a positive relation to the extent 
of copyright protection, and that the actual percentage of copyright renewals are so low 
that the possibility of perpetual rights has negligible effect, this analysis of works does not 
apply to the copyright of databases.14 Rather, the Amici Curiae brief by George A. Akerlof 
et al. with respect to the Eldred v. Ashcroft case (a critical case for copyright terms) better 
captures the question of copyright renewal for databases. In this brief, Akerlof et al. come 
to the conclusion that there is no discernible benefit in allowing the possibility of perpetual 
copyright, due to the inability of such a right to generate additional incentives to create, 
the additional costs that such a system would impose, and the minimal costs and bene-
fits that invalidate the rationale for such an undertaking.15 A similar view is expressed by 
Boldrin and Levine, observing that indefinite extensions of term makes consumers worse 
off, thus actually decreasing economic efficiency rather than increasing it.16 These latter 
analyses are even more relevant for the copyrights of databases, since the incentive to 
create is much more closely related to the ability to recoup the investments than other 
types of literary works. Additionally, database production is more sensitive to transaction 
costs, since a perpetual copyright would create a monopoly on information that might be 
necessary for the generation of other, new information and ideas, rather than a monopoly 
on the expression of ideas. 
All in all, the biggest and most impactful shortcoming in the legal protection of 
databases lies with intellectual property, as property is the basic infrastructure upon which 
markets are built. Combining the insight demonstrated by the European Union and the 
streamlined practicality of the United States can amend these shortcomings in the current 
legislation. The resulting system would be a more agile, and being much more easily tai-
lored to new technological trends, it can perhaps also be a starting point for greater future 
consensus across countries.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have explained the economics of competition, contract, and in-
tellectual property, defined databases as a common pool resource, shown the differences 
between the two extremes in the legal protection of databases, and defended a potential 
solution for the current extremes by finding a point of balance between their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
From an economic standpoint, intellectual property law is the most effective and 
efficient way to protect works like databases, since the existence of property rights is the 
foundation upon which markets can be built to function. Comparatively, contracts have 
limited enforceability beyond the immediate parties, and the applicability of competi-
tion law requires the prior existence of a market. However, pure copyright alone does not 
14  Landes and Posner 212
15  Brief  of  George A. Akerlof  et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of  Petitioners in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003), filed May 20, 2002.
16  Boldrin, Michelle, and David Levine. “Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allo-
cation of  Social Surplus from Innovations.” In Property Rights Dynamics: A Law and Economics 
Perspective. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007. 
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guarantee adequate protection, especially since databases can have such a wide range of 
properties, from pure public goods (i.e. government produced databases) to common pool 
resources (i.e. proprietary databases that can lose value if leaked). 
The two extremes compared are the United States and European Union legal sys-
tems with respect to the protection of databases. While the United States’ Supreme Court 
emphasizes the importance of originality as a defining factor of intellectual works worthy 
of copyright, the European Union’s Database Directive includes both originality and in-
vestments (of labor or resources) in the consideration of copyright. The problem with the 
former is an under protection of valuable works that require both intellectual and financial 
resources to create, thus unnecessarily increasing the likelihood of market failures in the 
form undersupply. The latter errs on the side of too much protection, lending itself to abuse 
and market failures in the form of monopolies. 
The solution to these complications is threefold. First, it is necessary to build a 
solid foundation of definitions, for databases, for characteristics that merit copyright or sui 
generis protection, for the scope of rights awarded, and for fair use exception. Secondly, it 
is necessary to determine different levels of protection according to the amount of original-
ity and to the amount of investments in forms outside of intellectual creativity (monetary 
investments, intellectual labor, etc.). It is important to maintain that though both originality 
and ‘sweat of the brow’ are accounted for, this does not necessarily signify that both should 
be awarded on the same scale. It is perfectly reasonable for courts to find originality a more 
compelling reason than labor or financial investment to award copyright, but the latter 
should not be completely disregarded in the interest of avoiding unnecessary transaction 
costs at best, or market failures at worst. Lastly, it is critical to clearly define limits to the 
copyright term, so as to avoid situations of the ‘perpetual renewal’ or everlasting term, 
which is counterproductive to the purpose of copyright.
Future steps to research this topic should include more empirical evidence in 
order to examine the effects of different legal regimes. Due to the fact that effects of legis-
lations typically take longer to manifest themselves (sometimes periods as long as a gener-
ation or two), it is currently unclear whether the European Union’s Database Directive and 
sui generis rights have positive, negative, or neutral impacts, or whether the United States’ 
simple originality threshold is preventing more robust innovation of information products. 
However, what is clear is that there needs to be a balance between the two, such that the 
law and economics underlying the database industry can be in harmony. 
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